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BOOK REVIEW
CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS?
A REVIEW OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM. By Richard A. Posner.*
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. Pp. xvii, 365. $25.50.
Jack M. Beermann **

Bureaucracy is a favorite target for criticism from the left and the
right. Bureaucratization of an organization is claimed to cause excessive
reliance upon rigid rules or the absence of rules altogether.' Few people
want to be part of a large bureaucracy and fewer still want to depend on
a bureaucracy for important benefits or policymaking. In recent years,
the business of the federal judiciary has increased dramatically. Congress has attempted to meet the rising caseload by increasing the number
of federal judges and assistants. As the federal court system becomes
more and more like administrative bureaucracies, the question has arisen
whether an increasingly bureaucratized federal judiciary can continue to
fulfill its basic functions.
Judge Richard Posner has joined the ranks of the naysayers. In The
Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform,2 Posner argues that responding to
the increased caseload by hiring more judges and law clerks poses serious
threats to the federal judiciary's competence. Posner instead proposes a
realignment (and reduction) of federal jurisdiction along the lines of an
economic theory of federalism, with the hope that a smaller federal judiciary with less work will be able to better perform its important functions. Posner suggests limits on federal jurisdiction over civil rights and
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
** Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison
(1980); J.D., University of Chicago (1983). Special thanks for guidance and friendship to Joe Singer,
Chip Lupu, Clay Gillette, Kathy Abrams, Avi Soifer, Duncan Kennedy, Ken Simons, Bob Seidman,
Stan Fisher, Ron Cass, Larry Yackle, Colin Diver, Larry Sager, and all of the participants in the
Boston University Faculty Workshop.
1 See Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary,92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1450-59 (1983) (discussing applicability of Max Weber's and Hannah Arendt's analyses of bureaucracy to the federal
judiciary).
2 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
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habeas corpus cases as areas that can afford the most substantial reductions in the federal caseload.
Because Posner's ultimate proposals for a "fundamental reorientation ' 3 of the federal courts' role may have serious social and moral implications, they must pass the scrutiny of readers who approach the proper
role of the federal courts from a variety of perspectives. Posner sets out
to persuade the reader of three central propositions that Posner believes
support his suggested reforms. First, he argues that a strong, independent federal judiciary is needed to ensure adherence to the constitutional
structure and to encourage qualified lawyers to seek appointment to the
bench and that, therefore, citizens should worry about the possibility that
the judiciary might be weakened significantly vis-A-vis the other branches
of government. 4 Second, he argues that a crisis exists for the federal
courts, or at least that the seeds of a crisis have been sown, requiring
major reforms.5 Third, Posner argues that it is economically inefficient
and contrary to his economic theory of federalism for the federal government and the federal courts to supervise state compliance with the Constitution. 6 Thus, the caseload crisis could be ameliorated by stripping the
federal courts of much of their civil rights and habeas corpus jurisdiction.
In this review, I address each of the strands of Posner's argument.
In Part I, I contend that Posner has not proved that the size of the federal court caseload is something that we should worry about, given his
focus on only the internal effects of the heavy federal docket. Particularly, Posner does not consider whether a smaller, less bureaucratic federal judiciary could meet society's needs. In Part II, I consider Posner's
view of the federal judiciary's proper role, and conclude that Posner's
vision lacks the clarity necessary to aid in discerning the proper role of
the federal courts.
Posner's reform proposals rest upon a view of federalism in which
the national government exists to prevent states from imposing the costs
7
of their operation on other states and to combat free-rider problems.
Federal court jurisdiction should exist, Posner claims, only when necessary to further these economic goals. I argue that Posner's "externalities" approach to federal jurisdiction suffers from the common failure of
economic analysis to address explicitly the accompanying moral and social implications. Posner's language of economic optimality proves an
unsuitable vehicle for discussing the many implications of federalism and
3 Id. at viii.
4 Id. at 23-59.
5 Id. at 59-130.
6 Id. at 169-223.

7 Free-rider problems exist when a program would be beneficial to more than one state, but not
beneficial enough to any single state to move the single state to act. Id. at 174-75. Posner would
allow federal intervention because high transactions costs prevent states from undertaking these
sorts of programs in concert. Once the federal government exists to serve these goals, the federal
government also must have authority to prevent the states from imposing costs upon it. Id. at 177.
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the federal courts' role in the federal system. I propose instead that the
proper role of the federal court system as an institution can be discussed
only with reference to the social goals and social values left out of Posner's discussion.

I.
The federal court caseload has grown dramatically in the past
twenty-five years. 8 The government has dealt with the increased demand
on the federal courts in two principal ways. First, the government has
doubled the number of federal judges and has quadrupled the number of
other federal judicial employees.9 Second, thousands of non-article III
personnel, such as bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and law clerks, perform judicial tasks.10 With judges supervising all these nonjudicial officials, the federal judiciary has become increasingly bureaucratized.

Although bureaucratic organization is common for powerful structures in the United States, bureaucracies provoke ambivalence. On the
one hand, if government and corporations are to accomplish useful social
tasks, bureaucratic organization is necessary."I On the other hand, bureaucratic structures are typically hierarchical, with power concentrated
in the hands of the people at the top. The movement toward bureaucratization creates fear because of the change in the life experiences of workers and consumers and the romantic image of freedom that
8 Between 1960 and 1983, annual district court filings rose 250% (from 79,200 to 277,031) and
annual court of appeals filings rose 686% (from 3,765 to 29,580). R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 61,

64, 82.
The Federal Courts contains a wealth of statistical information concerning the business and
composition of the federal court system. One weakness in the statistical and textual analysis is
Posner's decision not to discuss the other federal agencies that perform judicial tasks, such as the
National Labor Relations Board and the Social Security Administration (SSA). These agencies are
significant sources of federal court litigation, and under some of Posner's proposals their role would
be increased. For example, Posner would strengthen the internal appellate process of the SSA and
make SSA disability benefit determinations final and unreviewable, despite the recent episode in
which the SSA, for political reasons, refused to follow the law regarding procedure in disability
cases. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1493-97 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). Without further study of
agency caseloads and processes, such suggestions must be evaluated with caution.
9 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 27.
10 Id. at 97.
11 On the public side, it has been argued, for example, that bureaucratic organization is a good
way to implement developmental policies in less developed countries. See R. SEIDMAN, THE STATE,
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 191-344 (1978). "Congress has regularly chosen to rely upon administrative regulation ... to implement public policies in new and complex areas of federal concern." J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY:

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN Gov-

ERNMENT (1978).
On the private side, there is a wealth of literature from economists extolling the virtues of
organization of producers into firms. The literature has its roots in Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
in 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937). See generally R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 1-88 (1980).

1385

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

nonbureaucratic life represents. 12
Posner is concerned that the bureaucratization of the federal judiciary lowers the standard of living for federal judges by making their jobs
less satisfying. Posner points out two principal reasons for concern.
First, a bureaucratized judiciary cannot produce the highest quality opin13
ions because of the inadequate time and energy to supervise effectively.
Second, the decline in working conditions, together with the increased
workload, make judgeships less attractive for good lawyers.14 While Posner does not think that the quality of judicial appointments has declined,
15
he is afraid that it might in the future.
Remarkably, Posner, in arguing against the bureaucratization of
the judiciary, has focused almost exclusively on problems internal to the
legal system. He offers a litany of institutional problems: too much work
and too many judges, 16 too much reliance upon law clerks 17 and other
adjuncts, 18 too little time for oral argument, 19 increased use of unpublished opinions by courts of appeals, 20 and an increased number of
nonreasoned separate opinions. 2 1 Yet Posner identifies no social
12 For an excellent discussion of bureaucracy and a valuable collection of references, see Frug,
The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1984). Frug argues that
bureaucratic organization is antithetical to a society in which people are free to "create for themselves the form of organized existence within which they live." Id. at 1296. Because power is concentrated at the top of bureaucratic organizations, those lower down in the hierarchy experience
alienation and a loss of freedom in their everyday activity. Id. at 1279-80. Judge Posner's concerns,
however, focus on the people at the top of the hierarchy. As the workload for federal judges increases, judges have less time to pursue their own activities because they must devote so much energy to supervising others.
13 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 102-19.
14 The loss of prestige is aggravated by the fact that judicial salaries are much lower than the
earnings of private attorneys appointed to the federal bench. R.POSNER, supra note 2, at 41. Judge
Posner thinks it is politically unlikely that the salaries will increase significantly in the future. Id. at
99. If the power, prestige, and working conditions of federal judges continue to deteriorate, Posner
speculates that lawyers from the "top rank" will become unwilling to make the financial sacrifices
necessary to accept appointment. Id. at 41.
15 Id. at 111.
16 Id. at 99-100.
17 Id. at 102-19. Posner claims that law clerks have caused a decline in the quality of judicial
opinions.
18 Id. at 97. Adjuncts other than law clerks include staff attorneys, bankruptcy judges, and
magistrates. Posner elsewhere has argued that the Federal Magistrate Act, especially when it allows
magistrates "to preside and enter judgment in diversity cases," is unconstitutional. See Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J. dissenting).
19 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 119.
20 Id. at 120.

21 Id. at 128. A nonreasoned separate opinion is an opinion in which a judge dissents or concurs
in the judgment, but provides no reasons for not joining the majority opinion. Sometimes, the opinion amounts to a paragraph or less, and often the opinion contains no reasoning at all. See, e.g.,
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2918 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Posner
contradicts himself on this point because he also claims that judges, owing to the presence of law
clerks, have time to write more separate opinions. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 115.
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problems caused by the increased bureaucratization of the federal judiciary and virtually ignores the potential social implications of a drastic
restructuring of the system.
The best example of Posner's failure to consider society's interest in
an effective judicial bureaucracy is his treatment of the fact that judges
do not have time to write their own opinions. Law clerks and staff attorneys draft most of the opinions in the federal appellate courts. 22 Posner
thinks that opinions written by clerks are less authoritative than opinions
written by judges:2 3 "The less that lawyers and especially other judges
regard judicial opinions as authentic expressions of what the judges
think, the less they will rely on judicial opinions for guidance and authority."24 Posner does not suggest that clerk-written opinions suffer from
any lack of authority on the dispute before the court. The parties know
that whether the opinion is written by a judge or a law clerk, the judgment will be executed. Posner also does not raise the possibility that
other judges may refuse to recognize clerk-written opinions as authoritative. Judges apparently do not choose to cite only the opinions of judges
reputed to write their own opinions and to distinguish the work of others
as "inauthentic" and not binding.
Rather, Posner is worried that if opinions written by clerks do not
represent the views of the judge, courts will not follow the "broad holding" of the opinion.2 5 Posner cites Griswold v. Connecticut26 as an example. Narrowly read, Griswold holds that a state may not penalize married
couples who use contraceptives. 27 Read more broadly, however, the
opinion establishes a principle against state interference in the intimate
choices of individuals.2 8 Posner is afraid that if an opinion like Griswold
were written by a law clerk, other judges would not follow its broad
holding because they would not view the holding
as the authentic expres29
sion of the views of the judge in the case.
22 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 110.
23 Id. at 113. Judge Posner blames law clerks for numerous defects in present-day judicial opinions. According to Posner, clerk-written opinions are too long, stylistically uniform, poorly written,
and lacking in candor. The length of the average appellate court opinion in 1983 was 3,000 words,
compared with 2,300 in 1960. Id. at 112. Opinion length, however, has increased by a smaller
percentage than the increase in the length of trials at the district court level. Id. at 68. Posner
attributes the increase in the length of trials to "bigger" cases, because the extensive caseload has
pressured lawyers to dispose of smaller cases without a trial. Id. at 67-68. Posner does not suggest
that law clerks play a role in the length of trials.
24 Id. at 110.
25 Id.
26 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27 Id.

28 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 110.
29 Posner writes as if an authoritative broad holding of a case can compel specific results in later
cases. This is simply untrue. Judges are always free to choose between broad and narrow readings
of precedent, and I know of no instance in which a later decision was affected by considerations of
who drafted the earlier opinion. For example, the fact that Justice Douglas wrote the majority
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Courts should worry if opinions do not reflect the views of the
judges. An opinion written by a law clerk without adequate guidance
from the judge might not provide an accurate gauge for lawyers to predict what the court is likely to do in the next case. 30 Unpredictability in
the law creates additional costs, as parties pay more in legal fees for lawyers to construct their transactions and purchase insurance against more
possible problems. While Posner mentions uncertainty and increased litigation as consequences of less authoritative opinions, 3 1 Posner focuses
more on the internal effects of clerk-written opinions.
Moreover, Posner cites no empirical evidence that clerk-drafted
opinions are less authoritative than opinions written entirely by judges.
Posner's argument that opinions written by clerks and edited by judges
do not express the views of the particular judges relies on some fairly
uncharitable assumptions about the work habits and ability of his fellow
judges. 32 A good judge can easily supervise her clerks through predrafting instructions and careful editing to ensure that her own views are expressed. In fact, as Posner recognizes, many judges come from large law
firms and agencies, where they already have experienced the personal
transition from drafting to supervision. 33 This prior experience might
enable judges to express their views better than if they had to write their
own opinions. In fact, it may be that judges coming from the ranks of
academia are unique in their continued experience of writing first drafts
of their work.
Posner also disdains the increased bureaucratization of the federal
judiciary because of his fear that the era of great judges has passed. 34
Posner is "unable to visualize Oliver Wendell Holmes coordinating a
team of law clerks and secretaries and polishing the drafts that the clerks
submitted to him."'35 Posner would like judges to have the time to write
their own opinions so that those capable of greatness, like Holmes, can
stand out as they did in former times. Posner does not discuss whether
opinion in Griswold, see W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 172 (1980), has nothing to do with the
Supreme Court's decision to follow the logic of the "broad holding." Nothing in Griswold compelled
later decisions extending the rights of procreation, and the later cases did not rely on the fact that
Justice Douglas was one of the few Justices still writing the first drafts of his opinions.
30 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (law is a prediction of what
courts will do).
31 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 110.
32 Judge Posner grants that a "careful" judge might be capable of supervising her law clerks. He
apparently is not willing to indulge the assumption that enough of his colleagues will remain careful
when confronted with "the temptation to judicial carelessness that comes from having a staff of
eager young assistants quite willing to take responsibility from the judge's shoulders." Id. at 117.
33 Id. at 24-47.
34 Id. at 111.

35 Each Justice was entitled to a secretary, paid by the government. Holmes had a new one
every year, sent down by John Gray [later sent by E.R. Thayer and Felix Frankfurter] from the
Harvard Law School. They arrived in September, the pick of the graduating class. Filled with
zeal they sat down ... expecting to read important briefs for the Justice, to examine motion
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the absence of judges like Holmes, Cardozo, and Learned Hand would
harm or help society's efficiency or productivity. His concern that the

federal judiciary will lose great judges as it continues to grow seems sentimental at best. Moreover, when considering the reform of an important
social institution, can a society really afford to indulge in this quest for
the great judge? Posner offers no firm opinion on why the amount of
federal litigation has increased so greatly.3 6 The increase in the amount
of litigation that has hit both the federal and state courts may indicate
that society actually needs the big bureaucracy Posner belittles in order
to settle disputes and to clarify shifting boundaries of governmental

power. Our need as a society for effective, large-scale dispute resolution
may outweigh the loss of "greatness" that so concerns Posner. In a
large, more complex society, greatness may be more difficult to achieve.
Surprisingly, Posner's book completely lacks any discussion of the
social effects of the increased caseload or, for that matter, of his own
proposed reforms.3 7 The period since 1960 has been one of great social
change, and even crisis. Problems like racial discrimination and poverty

have not disappeared. The federal courts could play an active role in
trying to solve many social problems.3 8 Any discussion of major reforms
institution is incomplete without consideration of social
to an important
39

consequences.
Unless one feels that the changes brought by the increased caseload
are intrinsically bad,4° one could tell an altogether different story regardpapers, and petitions for certiorari. It did not take a day to discover that the Justice did not
need a secretary.
... He wrote out his own opinions, looked up his citations, read every petition for certioran....
He showed them his written opinions, talked to them about the cases. Sometimes he
,
lent one of them to another Justice: none of his brethren had secretaries beyond the stenographer class.
C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND His FAMILY 379 (1944).

36 See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 87. While Posner speculates that an increase in the available
legal rights of potential plaintiffs and the effect of inflation on the unchanged jurisdictional amount
for diversity cases might be the causes of the increase in the caseload, he ultimately acknowledges
that the reasons behind the growth in federal litigation are "poorly understood."
37 This is in marked contrast to Posner's other work, which purports to increase our understanding of the social effects of legal rules. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
38 See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
39 For example, Fiss bases his analysis of the bureaucratization of the courts on the social role he
believes the federal courts should play. Fiss, supra note 1, at 1461.
40 Posner, at times, assumes that certain features of the judiciary are immutable, so that changes
are necessarily bad. For instance, because large en banc panels might be unwieldy and difficult to
assemble, the Ninth Circuit is experimenting with en banc panels of eleven judges (instead of all
twenty-eight active circuit judges). Posner claims that the use of randomly drawn panels of eleven
judges (always including the chief judge) suffers from "a lack of intrinsic authority" because the
losing party will blame "the luck of the draw rather than the superior authority of the special panel
over the original three-judge panel." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 102. If this sort of procedure were
instituted in all circuits above a certain size, it would not lack any more authority than the randomly
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ing the performance of the federal courts and the role they have played in
the past few decades. 4 1 The story could be told in economic terms, in
which federal judicial services are a commodity not much in demand
until recently. Over the past couple of decades, however, demand for
those services has increased greatly and the people, through their elected
representatives in Congress, have elected to keep the price down by increasing the supply to meet the demand. 4 2 Thus, many more people are
able to take advantage of this government service.
In fact, the federal courts have done an excellent job in coping with
the increased business. Congress has appointed many more judges, and
these judges have become more productive through longer hours and the
expanded use of assistants like law clerks. Because the law clerks have
more time to write opinions, opinions now contain more detailed explanations of their holdings. More people would rather sue in the federal
courts, where the quality of judge is considered to be higher and delays
remain shorter than in state courts. 43 Even though alternatives such as
arbitration, state court, private settlement, and mediation are usually
available, the federal courts often do a better job at a lower cost.
The federal courts are so efficient at what they do, they are apparently able to do more of it. Along with congressional expansion of legal
rights, the federal courts have reinterpreted statutes and the Constitution
in ways that provide relief for more injured people than ever before. 44 In
addition, during the recent period of radical social change expanding the
rights of blacks, other racial and ethnic minorities, women, and handicapped persons, the federal courts have assumed a leadership role in
eliminating social injustice. 45 The federal courts have proven aptly suited
drawn three-judge panel (or the randomly drawn district judge). Posner seems to view the current
method of doing things as "intrinsically correct," a view that often colors his analysis in ways he
does not explain or justify.
41 The ability to take facts and portray them in a persuasive manner is one of the key skills of a
good lawyer. See Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). If the reader views the judiciary in terms of a crisis, Posner has succeeded in demonstrating his persuasive legal skills.
42 Subsidization of the litigation process is understandable because society at large benefits
through the calming of disputes and the production of precedents. See R. POSNER, supra note 37, at
401-02.
43 In federal court, it now takes only one and one-half months longer to get from filing to final
disposition on appeals than it did in 1960. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 96 (Table 4.1).
44 In the absence of examination of actual social causes, increased litigiousness can always be
portrayed in two radically different fashions. The increased number of lawyers and lawsuits may be
a symptom of a conflict-ridden society, in which no one is satisfied with the status quo. The same
facts, however, may appear in a more positive light. The increased availability of lawyers and the
expansion of legal rights leading to more litigation has contributed to a more just society in which
injured persons are more likely to be compensated. The latter view was the theme of a speech to the
November 1983 admittees to the Illinois bar, given by Illinois Supreme Court Justice Seymour Simon. See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-77 (1977) (discussing problem of underutilization of legal services).
45 This contrasts with the courts' active opposition to social change during the infamous Lochner
era. The Lochner era (named after Lochner v. New York, 108 U.S. 45 (1905)) was a period of about
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to fulfilling a basic function of government: protecting the weaker elements of society from oppression by the stronger. 46 While this interpretation of the increased caseload may be as false as Posner's, at least it
attempts to relate the work of the federal courts to its effect on the
outside world. Posner's crisis may be a crisis only for those federal
judges who would like to work less and have more time to write on their
own. No doubt the federal courts have a lot more work to do than they
did twenty-five years ago and the job of a federal judge is increasingly
that of a supervisor and not of a writer. Posner's failure to illustrate
social problems caused by the increased workload of the federal courts,
however, leads me to speculate that the problems do not exist on nearly
the scale that would demand drastic reforms. Only when the federal
courts are viewed in their political context does the need for reform become evident.
II.
Reforming an important social institution is a difficult undertaking.
The process of formulating reform proposals involves several distinct
steps. One of the steps must involve the creation of a vision, however
tentative, of the desired social role of the reformed institution. Without
such a vision, we have no benchmark against which to measure the viability of any reforms. Posner has not provided a picture of what role the
federal courts should play in society, or even within the government
structure itself. Thus, it is impossible to evaluate Posner's reform proposals except against standards external to Posner's book.
The proper role of the federal courts has long been a center of controversy. Federal courts assume great power when they set about supervising other branches of government. Issues concerning the power of the
federal courts arise most often in the areas of judicial review of state and
federal legislation and federal administrative action for compliance with
constitutional and statutory limits. Posner attempts to explain the appropriate role of the federal courts in these contexts. Although Posner
obviously wants the federal courts to have less power relative to the
other branches of government, his analysis is vague and self-contradictory, providing little guidance on just what role the federal courts should
play.
The greatest concentration of power in the hands of judges is the
power of judicial review for constitutionality. Despite the longstanding
25 years in the early twentieth century during which the Supreme Court invalidated many legislative
attempts at economic regulation as violative of substantive due process. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517 (10th ed. 1980).
46 According to John Locke's political theory, people joined civil society to ensure security-to
"[protect] the innocent by allowing defense against wrongful attacks." P. RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 72 (1982) (discussing J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690)).
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debate on the propriety of judicial review,4 7 Posner uncritically accepts
the conclusion that federal judges have the power to declare federal and
state legislation unconstitutional. 4 8 The most important lawmaking
function of the federal courts, and the source of much of their power, is
"keeping the other branches of government [both federal and state]
within the bounds set by the Constitution. '4 9 Posner's model thus emphasizes a strong, independent federal judiciary, for only an independent
body could maintain the political power necessary to sit in review of the
other branches.50
Posner recognizes that judicial review places great power in the
hands of federal judges, and he offers two distinct justifications for it.
First, Posner claims that the enforcement of constitutional norms would
be greatly undercut if legislative or executive decisions on constitutionality were final.5 1 Second, Posner reasons that the power involved in a
federal judgeship ensures that people will accept appointments despite
52
the financial sacrifice that many potential candidates would undergo.
Thus, Posner believes that a federal judiciary with power over the other
branches is necessary both to ensure compliance with the Constitution
and to encourage financially successful lawyers to seek and accept
appointments.
The power associated with a judgeship, according to Posner, relates
to the caseload, because a greater caseload requires more judges, diluting
47 Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (courts have power of judicial
review) with Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 345-56 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J.) (arguing against
judicial review). See A. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); L. HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1958); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1978); Thayer, Origin and Scope

of the American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). For a collection of the
various strands of the debate, see Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay
on ConstitutionalScholarship andJudicialReview, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1207 (1984) (characterizing current debate as an "obsession.").
48 Posner bases his acceptance ofjudicial review largely on the words of article VI of the Constitution and on Federalist 78.
49 R. POSNER, supranote 2, at 7. Posner divides the functions of a court system into two categories-dispute resolution and law creation. Id. at 3. One of Posner's first proposals for reform is
directed at the dispute resolution function. Posner suggests that trial delays, "a subject of much
adverse comment since Shakespeare," may serve the positive function of allowing passions to cool
over time. Id. at 6. Thus, he suggests that the Supreme Court abandon its practice of clearing the
docket at the end of each term. While more time for the Court to consider difficult cases might be
useful, it is impossible to believe that allowing the parties to cool their heels for an extra few months,
after the years it normally takes for a case to reach the stage of plenary review by the Supreme
Court, would have much effect on the passions of the parties. Posner's anecdotal suggestions, like
this one, appear throughout the book and detract from its effectiveness. An ill-considered suggestion
might interfere with one's evaluation of the rest of the book. Interestingly, Judge Posner's statistics
indicate that the caseload crisis of the past twenty years has not caused much of an increase in the
time from initial filing in the district court to disposition in the court of appeals. Id. at 95-96.
50 Id. at 20.

51 Id. at 17. This is the traditional reason, stressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 31.
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the power of the individual judge and decreasing the prestige associated
with a judgeship.5 3 Posner, however, does not want the federal courts to
exercise their power too often. Moreover, Posner makes numerous suggestions aimed at decreasing the power of individual judges, though he
never discusses the possibility that these suggestions might undermine his

argument in favor of a powerful bench. In fact, because Posner's proposals would eliminate almost all of the federal judiciary's control over state
enforcement of and compliance with federal civil rights law, it is uncer-

tain whether Posner seriously believes that a strong federal judiciary is
important or even desirable. Perhaps Posner recognizes that contemporary legal thought would not entertain any proposal that did not at least
appear to accept federal judicial control over state compliance with the

Constitution.
Posner's principal proposal would decrease the power of federal
judges by adopting new standards of constitutional review. Posner advocates a presumption against constitutional claims and thus a greater deference by judges to the decisions of the other branches on constitutional
matters. Posner offers two reasons for this presumption. First, although
Posner ideally would adhere strictly to the framers' intent in constitu-

tional interpretation, the uncertainty inherent in "ascertain[ing] the
meaning of a centuries-old document" makes deference to the political
system desirable. 54 Second, Posner asserts that the costs of erroneously
declaring a statute unconstitutional are greater than the costs of an erroneous denial of a constitutional right.5 5 Therefore, unless someone has a
53 Id. at 272.
54 Id. Posner does not provide a theory to help determine when the meaning of a constitutional
provision might be clear enough to warrant judicial enforcement. Posner argues for absolute enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights when "the fundamental right in question has firm
constitutional roots." Id. at 275. Posner provides two examples of fundamental rights: the right to
be free from racial discrimination, which is firmly rooted in the Constitution, and the right to be free
from regulation of sexual activity, which is not. Posner apparently is looking for "specific constitutional provenance," which presumably exists for antidiscrimination rights in the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment but not for free sexual activity, which is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Id. Even a simple constitutional provision, however, can pose complicated problems of interpretation and thus provide ample room for value-based applications. See
Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 683
(1985) (arguing that no constitutional provision is so clear that it need only be "applied"); infra note
57. Moreover, the equal protection clause does not mention race. Thus, Posner's analysis is unclear
on how one is to go about discovering firmly rooted rights.
55 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 272. As an historical matter, Posner may have some support in
the record of federal statutes that have been invalidated, at least if one views as costly the Supreme
Courts' historic resistance to progressive legislation. See P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE
& E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-20 (4th ed. 1977). My late colleague Robert Liberman, an
opponent ofjudicial review of federal statutes, liked to ask supporters ofjudicial review if they could
identify a federal statute from which they are glad the Supreme Court saved us. He also asked
whether judicial review is worth the costs to the generations of blacks who grew up under Jim Crow
laws partly as a result of the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Counterexamples of course exist, such as the Supreme Court's
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"clear constitutional right . . . doubts should be resolved against the
claimant." 56 Because the instances of true "clarity" in the Constitution
are so few, Posner's theory would not allow the courts much
power to
57
fulfill the function of keeping the other branches in check.
Posner's preference for minimal judicial review places a low value
on adherence to the Constitution. Posner does not know, however, the
actual price people would exact to surrender protection of their constitutional rights. Rarely are potential victims of constitutional deprivations
presented with a choice between economic benefits and preservation of
constitutional norms. Posner may place little value on constitutional
rights, but unless he can convince the reader that his valuation is prevalent and embodied in the Constitution, his assumption does not accurately reflect the costs and benefits of decreased enforcement of
constitutional rights.
Posner's presumption offers no guidance in some constitutional
cases and rests on a misconception of the nature of constitutional litigation in others. Many constitutional cases involve disputes between governmental agencies over the distribution of regulatory authority.5 8 Each
governmental agency makes a constitutional claim to the power to regulate and denies the validity of the other agencies' claims. A presumption
against constitutional claims is useless in these cases. In other cases, private claimants argue that the government has exceeded its constitutionally granted power.5 9 Such a case is most accurately portrayed as the
government's making the constitutional "claim" to authority with the
private party's denying that claim's validity.
Posner's presumption, however, is not against constitutional claims.
Rather, Posner opposes individuals who argue that the government's
constitutional claim should be rejected. Posner supports increased government power through limited judicial review. This presumption is surprising in light of his other works that stand for the opposite
invalidation of segregated public schools in the District of Columbia. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954). The possibility ofjudicial review also might make Congress more careful to stay within
constitutional limits. I find it impossible to estimate ex ante the costs and benefits of judicial review,
and Posner's book does not purport to provide a method for doing so.
56 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 273.
57 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798) (Justice Paterson's acknowledgement
that applying the ex post facto clause requires interpretation; the clause "must be taken in [its]
technical ... not... literal sense."). The ex post facto clause presents many interesting problems in
interpretation, such as whether it applies to sentence increases or changes in the conditions of parole.
See Heirens v. Mizell, 729 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1984) (overruling prior application of ex post facto
clause to parole decisions). Under Posner's standard, unless the definition of "clear" were very
loose, few constitutional rights would be enforceable. Posner does not discuss how this relates to his
argument that judicial review is necessary to ensure compliance with constitutional norms.
58 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding federal
power to overrule state government wage decisions).
59 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal
power under commerce clause to regulate racial practices of small hotel in Atlanta.)
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under a cost-benefit analysis, less regulation is often
proposition-that
60
preferable.
Posner's proposal also favors more deferential review of state laws.
He argues for a consensus-based standard for review of state legislation,
under which a federal court should strike down state laws under the due
process clause only when they represent "deviations from the national
consensus that are so extreme, so shocking, that they threaten national
unity."' 61 This consensus theory provides little guidance in actual cases.
For example, before Roe v. Wade 62 was decided, several states legalized
abortion. Today, some antiabortion groups have taken to bombing abortion clinics. One could argue that the feelings aroused by the laws allowing abortion are so strong that the courts should strike them down as
a threat to national unity. On the other hand, militant supporters of the
right to seek an abortion also exist. One, therefore, also could argue that
the courts should invalidate prohibitions against abortion. As long as
each side can present a realistic argument, Posner's standard adds nothing to resolving the question of constitutionality.
Because Posner's standard is so pliable and ambiguous, it does not
help establish the proper role judges should play in ordering power relationships in society. Posner recognizes the weakness of his consensus63
based approach, but its indeterminacy does not seem to worry him.
Posner's "reforms" of the standards of judicial review embody both the
ideal of the deferential judge and the strong judge protecting society from
unwise legislation. Posner never reveals how this proposal affects the
goals he ascribed to judicial review in the first instance, protecting constitutional norms and maintaining the attractiveness of a judicial
appointment.
Posner is anxious for federal judges to defer to the other branches,
and if his standards of constitutional review will not accomplish this
alone, perhaps an extraconstitutional principle of self-restraint will.
Under Posner's principle, the federal judge should "limit his court's
power over other government institutions... [by deferring] to decisions
of Congress, of the federal administrative agencies, of the executive
branch, and of all branches and levels of state government." 64
60 See generally R. POSNER, supra note 37.
61 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 195. Here, Posner purports to follow the lead of Justice Cardozo
in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937), and Justice Frankfurter in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 194.
62 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 195-96.
No doubt, though this approach would prevent some experimentation: for it is hard to distinguish the first experiment from the shocking deviation. But this is not such a bad thing. Most
new ideas are bad, and the new ideas that are good, or at least that reflect powerful forces in the
society, will hang on tenaciously.
64 Id. at 208. While Posner portrays this new deference as restraint, Peter Gabel has argued that
it is actually an activist effort to replace liberal ideology and create "a new dominant social consciousness" to legitimize the "intense privatization of everyday life." Gabel, The Mass Psychology of
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Posner's principle of self-restraint could seriously undermine the
goal of enforcing constitutional norms, upon which Posner relied in establishing the legitimacy of judicial review. 65 Moreover, the principle
could erode Congress' power to supervise the administration of statutory
programs. In constitutional cases, judicial review of the action of other
branches purports to maintain the balance of power as set by the Constitution. Only Posner's disagreement with current constitutional doctrine
leads him to argue that judicial restraint is necessary to maintain the
appropriate balance of power among the branches of government. For
one who agrees with current federal court applications of the Constitution, judicial restraint would undermine constitutional norms and give
the other branches greater power than is allotted by the Constitution.
The notion that courts could reduce their power over other governmental institutions by deferring to administrative agencies belies the full
significance of this type ofjudicial restraint. The power of Congress over
the administrative agencies is also implicated in Congress' reliance on the
courts, through judicial review, to keep agencies within their statutory
mandates. The courts, in effect, serve as Congress' monitor of the agencies. Because Congress sets limits to agency action, and prohibits arbitrary agency action generally, 66 a decision in deference to agency power
might contravene congressional intent by granting the agency too much
power. If courts followed Posner's suggestion and increased their deference to agency action, it might be difficult for Congress to restrain the
agencies. The consequences of this possible loss of control must be explored before the wisdom of any increase in judicial deference is
embraced.
Posner's proposals aimed at judicial restraint are fairly indeterminate and therefore unlikely to cause much change without a significant
alteration of the political character of the federal judiciary. Institutional
change, however, could make a big difference because it might not be as
easily avoided. But Posner fails to present a picture of what the federal
courts, as an institution, should be. On the one hand, he accepts judicial
review, giving the federal courts great power over the other branches of
government. Judicial review makes the judiciary all-powerful because
every agency or congressional action is made at the sufferance of the
judges who could rule it unconstitutional. 67 On the other hand, Posner
the New Federalism: How the Burger Court'sPoliticalImagery Legitimizes the PrivatizationofEveryday Life, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 263, 268 (1984). By deferring to governmental agencies whose
actions are challenged by individuals, the Court would be "vindicat[ing] the authority of those in
power against those who lack power within the hierarchy-system." Id. at 267.
65 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
67 This argument resembles the legal realist attack on the public/private distinction in constitutional law. Since common law rules are made by the government, all applications of the rules, such
as in property or contract law, are delegations from the sovereign. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Similarly, as long as the judiciary retains the power of judicial
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wants federal judges to defer to the other branches to keep their caseload
down and to limit the force of constitutional rights.
Posner's discussion illustrates our ambivalence toward placing
power in the hands of federal judges by which they could interfere with
the decisions of the other branches. 68 On the one hand, we can identify
with the federal judge who is trying to do the right thing. Federal judges,
by and large, have similar backgrounds to those in academia, including a
shared educational experience. The strong federal district judge keeping
the state bureaucrats in line is a dominant figure of our legal consciousness. Yet life for the oppressed has not changed much since federal district judges started using the civil rights laws for reform, and our
confidence has been shaken by the lack of progress. Posner attempts to
embody both images of the federal judge, without explicitly discussing
how aspects of his theory that depend upon a strong judiciary are affected by the aspects that depend on a weakened judiciary. Posner thus
leaves us uncertain about how much political power federal judges
should have. As Posner acknowledges, federal judges need power to police state and federal government effectively. In order to reduce the federal court caseload, however, Posner is willing to sacrifice the
constitutional values that the institution of judicial review is designed to
protect.
Although Posner calls for fundamental reform in the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, his proposals are rather moderate. Posner's most significant proposal is for a drastic curtailment of federal court protections
of individual rights. He purports to arrive at his proposal through application of an economic analysis of federal jurisdiction. In the following
section, I argue that this economic analysis does not provide the proper
language for discussing federal court jurisdiction.
III.
Law is pervaded by contradiction, and the law of federal courts is no
exception. Since the Supreme Court activated the Reconstruction Era
review, it can delegate constitutional powers to the other branches. Even if certain areas of congressional or executive activity were placed off-limits under doctrines like abstention or political question, the judiciary would remain all-powerful if it retained exclusive power to expound those
doctrines. Although one could avoid an all-powerful judiciary by setting up a system in which court
decisions on constitutionality were not binding upon the other branches of government, the federal
courts have not chosen that course.
68 For a more detailed and illuminating discussion of our ambivalence toward state intervention,
see Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: ForBaby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933,
946-50 (1985). Minow's focus is on state intervention in the family. She argues that our ambivalence toward intervention in the family has its source in two different images of the family, one
positive and one negative. Similarly, there are radically disparate images of the state itself, one as a
vehicle for political expression and one as the tool of the ruling class' oppression of the politically
powerless. One's view of the appropriateness of federal intervention into state policy depends to an
extent on one's image of the state along the spectrum outlined above.
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civil rights legislation in Monroe v. Pape,69 the scope of federal court jurisdiction against state officials has been a hotly contested issue. The line
between permissible and impermissible federal court intervention into
state affairs is one of the most wavering lines in American law. 70 Controversies about the proper scope of federal power center on a view toward
placing authority in the state or federal agency with the most competence
in the subject area. An additional policy argument focuses on experi71
mentation within the states so new ideas can be tried on a smaller scale.
Finally, another policy supports comity-proper respect for state govern72
ment-apparently detached from any separate instrumental concern.
Two fundamentally conflicting theories discuss the proper role of
the federal courts. According to the "conservative" view, the federal
courts should interfere with state affairs only rarely and as a last resort.
The conservative view sees state courts as competent to adjudicate federal rights. 73 The conservative view also espouses the benefits of allowing
states the widest latitude possible in conducting public policy experiments. 74 Finally, according to this view the federal courts show disrespect for state tribunals when they take jurisdiction of cases that state
75
courts could resolve.
The contrary, "liberal" view discloses an expressed distrust of state
agencies. According to the liberal view, the Civil War history radically
69 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
70 Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (principles of "Our Federalism," including policy behind Anti-Injunction Act, bar federal court injunction of ongoing state criminal
prosecution) with Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (Civil Rights Act of 1871 was part of a
vast transformation of federalism and is an explicit exception to the Anti-Injunction Act). See Soifer
& Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1141 (1977).
71 The course in the federal courts has been described as "the purest of contentless legalist rituals, in which all 'policy' arguments are grounded in funhouse mirror versions of Competence and
Federalism whether they can conceivably be brought to bear on particular cases or not." Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 n.65 (1984). All too often, arguments concerning the proper
scope of federal jurisdiction do not account for the actual social consequences. Abstract phrases like
"political experimentation" and "Our Federalism" substitute for hard analysis. See Younger v. Harris, 461 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Kelman, supra at 44; Soifer & Macgill, supra note 70; see also Brennan,
How Goes the Supreme Court?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 781, 784 (1985):
[F]ederalism has taken on a new meaning of late in the Supreme Court.... Under the banner
of vague, undefined notions of equity, comity, and federalism, the Court has condoned both
isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties.... The fact that state courts have a duty to
safeguard individual rights, and are honoring that duty, cannot justify the Supreme Court in
going on to limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. For to do so is to forget that one of
the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for the rights
of our citizens.
72 See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE vii (1984).

73 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (rejecting expertise and greater sensitivity
to federal rights as a basis for allowing federal habeas corpus review of fourth amendment issues).
74 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 174 (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) and New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
75 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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changed the balance of governmental power in favor of the federal government. The liberal argument asserts that federal courts have been assigned primary responsibility for enforcement of federal rights because
they are more competent, 76 because they are more sympathetic to those
rights, 77 and because the states' freedom to conduct social experiments
that deprive individuals of federal rights is not worth the price of experi-

mentation. The liberal view sees federal courts as the "guardians of the
people's federal rights," ready to step in "to protect the people from un'78
constitutional action under color of state law."

Both the liberal and conservative views have had their share of vic-

tories and defeats. 79 The liberals and conservatives each won battles con-

cerning the role of state remedies in civil rights suits. 80 After
81
inconsistent results concerning the scope of state sovereign immunity,
the conservative arguments have emerged with a new vitality. 82 The lib-

eral-conservative skirmish over federal civil rights policy repeats itself
endlessly. 83 Often the arguments center on how the Civil War should

76 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80
(1961). Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit has argued that the cost to federal policy of shifting
federal question cases to the state courts might be great:
[T]he experience with dual sovereignty between 1790 and 1860 teaches us that it will not work as
a legal system unless the national government undertakes to have its own courts in place
throughout its territory providing prompt and effective enforcement or relief under the national
laws.... Today federal government interests, both in the enforcement of national substantive
policies and in the protection of individual civil rights, are hundreds of times more complex
than they were from 1790 to 1860. The need for prompt and effective remedies in the courts of
the nation is therefore far more apparent.
Gibbons, FederalLaw and the State Courts: 1790-1866, 36 RUTGERS L. REV.399, 452-53 (1984).
77 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
78 Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242; see also Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundations and an
EmpiricalStudy, 67 CORNELL L. REV.482, 484-87 (1982); Soifer, ProtectingCivilRights: A Critique
ofRaoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 670-77 (1979).
79 See Soifer & Macgill, supranote 70, at 1173 ("In Supreme Court litigation [regarding federalism] whoever wins, it won't be for good and it won't be for long.").
80 Compare Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (state administrative remedies need
not be exhausted before federal civil rights suit may be brought) with Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1980) (state remedy might provide due process and thus defeat federal claim).
81 Compare Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (eleventh amendment does not bar federal
court damage award against state in employment discrimination case) and Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S.
123 (1908) (eleventh amendment sovereign immunity does not protect unconstitutional action by
state official) with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (federal court may not order retroactive
monetary payments of state funds wrongfully withheld).
82 See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity bars federal court injunction against state officials who violate state law).
83 Another good example is government official immunity from damage awards. See, ag., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (state judge may be enjoined from violating Constitution and may
be held liable for plaintiff's attorneys' fees); Briscoe v. Lattue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police officers
immune from damage award for pejuring themselves in violation of criminal defendant's constitutional rights).
Because the Supreme Court admittedly has resisted the "literal" meaning of the civil rights
laws, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), its actions have come under attack as violating
separation-of-powers principles. The argument made against the abstention doctrine is that the
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inform our view of federal-state relations.8 4 Judge Posner's aim is to provide a scientific answer to these questions by adopting an economic approach to the allocation of responsibility among the various institutions.
Posner proposes a new method for determining appropriate intervention by federal courts in preventing deprivations of federal rights.8 5
In fact, Posner proposes that his economic analysis can determine the
substantive contours of federal policy. Posner's theory of federalism prefers local (that is, state or municipal) responsibility, except when "either
the benefits or the costs of a governmental action are experienced outside
the jurisdiction where the action is taken."'8 6 Posner thinks that the federal court caseload can be reduced by analyzing each federal substantive
regulation and each grant of federal court jurisdiction with the intention
of retaining only the jurisdiction necessary to prevent externalities and
87
free-rider problems.
Posner's theory justifies several types of federal jurisdiction.88 Posner's theory points toward moderate change in various areas, including
diversity cases, in which state preferences for residents can externalize
costs: suits against the federal government, in which costs could be externalized onto the federal government; federal crimes, in which the benefits of prosecution would be enjoyed in several jurisdictions; and some
admiralty cases, in which the costs of defending in several local jurisdictions would be too great.
Posner finds room for the greatest reform in the area of federal enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states. Posner believes that
"few if any of these rights can be derived from a concern with externalities." 8 9 Despite the oppression of blacks since the Civil War, Posner
courts intrude on congressional power when they refuse to apply legislation (here, jurisdiction-granting statutes) according to its terms. See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). The Supreme Court denies the charge that it has
thwarted congressional will with the rejoinder that if Congress intends to radically transform federal-state relations, it must explicitly say so. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The
natural response is that Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, said so.
84 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
85 Federal intervention might be desirable in two analytically distinct categories of cases. Federal jurisdiction might be necessary when the state itself or a state official is the party violating
federal law. Federal jurisdiction also might be necessary when a private party is violating federal law
and there is uncertainty over whether state adjudicative processes would protect the federal interest
involved. Posner's analysis is aimed at both categories.
86 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 174. Posner relies upon three arguments for preferring local
government responsibility. First, local governments have more incentive to act according to their
constituents' preferences because they must compete for citizens with other localities. Second, decentralization also allows for experimentation, which might produce useful innovation. Third, economies of scale point toward less centralization in the American system. Id.
87 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
88 Posner assumes that wherever substantive federal policy exists there is a good argument for
federal jurisdiction, because state courts could thwart federal policies. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at
175.
89 Id. at 179.
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claims that "the costs of that oppression were borne mainly in the southern, rather than the northern, states." 90 With respect to other areas of
contemporary federal concern, Posner argues, "[E]ven more clearly,
rights against age discrimination, sex discrimination, cruel and unusual
punishment, double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal
cases, and similar rights that occupy much of the attention of the federal
courts today have little to do with interstate spillovers." 9 1 Thus, Posner
would strip federal courts of much of their jurisdiction over enforcement
92
of federal constitutional rights in habeas corpus and section 1983 cases.
There are many federal laws that attack problems for which there
are no externalities under Posner's analysis. The Reconstruction Era
civil rights laws, which forbid deprivation of federally protected rights,
often reach violations that are wholly intrastate. The thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery cannot be explained by a fear of externalities, since the costs of slavery were borne within the southern states that
allowed slavery. 93 Posner's theory cannot account for the passage of the
fourteenth amendment insofar as it protects intrastate victims of due process and equal protection violations. Modern civil rights legislation, formally founded on congressional power to regulate interstate commerce,
always has been more concerned with principles of just treatment than
with the flow of goods and services. Outrage and the unwillingness or
inability of states to guarantee federal rights were important factors in
94
the development of modern civil rights law.
90 Id. at 180.

91 Id.
92 Posner would allow for "effective federal judicial review" of issues involving the rights of
convicted criminals because "[i]n most states the rights of the guilty enjoy little political favor." Id.
at 187. This aspect of Posner's analysis is different from his basic externalities approach because the
costs to the politically unpopular group are not externalized. If the federal right involved is not
related to externalization, under Posner's externalities theory, federal authorities should not enforce
the right. Interestingly, the "unpopularity of guilty criminals" analysis would point toward overruling Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), because that case shielded a non-guilt-related right (the
right to have illegally seized evidence excluded at trial) from federal habeas corpus review.
Because criminals who raise rights related to guilt are not, in Posner's view, unpopular, "[tihere
is no reason ... for the federal courts to worry lest states convict their innocent citizens." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 188. Under Posner's analysis, the costs of convicting an innocent citizen are
borne wholly within the convicting state, thus defeating any need for federal intervention. Posner
here overlooks the fact that almost all people seeking review of guilt-related rights will have been
convicted. Thus, they will be members of the unpopular class.
93 This does not include the emotional costs of slavery, which were felt throughout the country
and beyond. See infra note 98 for a discussion of emotional costs and Posner's externalities theory;
see also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972).
94 John Stuart Mill observed that
[it would not be a matter personally indifferent to the rest of the country if any part of it
became a nest of robbers or a focus of demoralization, owing to the maladministration of its
police.... Security of person and property and equal justice between individuals are the first
needs of society and the primary end of government.
J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 222-23 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1958).
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The principal weakness of Posner's economic analysis of federalism
is its inability to account for the bulk of federal civil rights regulation.
The origin of federal power over constitutional rights and equal treatment has more to do with history, morals, and social considerations than
with optimality in the distribution of governmental power. Federal interests are not methodically, as Posner would have it, determined by the
effect one state's policies might have on residents of other states or on the
federal government. The federal government, as reconstituted under the
fourteenth amendment, is not merely a referee between the states. The
federal government has assumed substantive responsibilities of its own,
and it is only after the federal government determines its policies that one
can measure whether states are imposing externalities on the federal
government.
For example, Posner would argue that there should be no federal
policy against age discrimination in state employment since the costs of
such discrimination would be borne wholly within the state in which it
was practiced. But it is impossible to determine whether the federal government would bear the cost of discrimination without knowing the federal government's policy with regard to the discrimination. If the federal
government had a policy against age discrimination, any discrimination
practiced by the states would be a cost "imposed" on the federal government and a proper matter for federal concern under externalities analysis. Under Posner's theory, it is impossible to determine what should
count as a cost without first engaging in traditional policy-based analysis.
The federal government's interests extend to all matters within its substantive policymaking powers in all of the states. Whenever federal policies are frustrated, there is a cost imposed on the federal government's
interests.
Posner's theory does not include intrastate deprivations of civil
rights as matters of national concern because he does not include moralisms as costs created by deprivations of civil rights. Counting moral outrage as a cost, admits Posner, would "pretty much [erase] the distinction
between internal and external costs" and thus destroy the utility of his
theory of federalism. 9 5 But moral outrage is a cost of many activities and
is a motivating factor of many people's support for environmental protection and welfare programs for the poor.96 Strong antislavery feelings moAccording to Mill, the national government could best handle questions of justice because local
officials might put local concerns above protection of rights. Id.; see also United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 819 (1966) (appendix to the opinion of the Court) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d.
Sess. 3613 (1870)) (remarks of Sen. Pool that national government has right and duty to protect
federal rights within the states; enforcement cannot be left "to the mere caprice of States"); Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in MandatingState Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
95 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 180.

96 See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.
387, 398-400 (1981).
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tivated abolitionists in the pre-Civil War era. 97 Posner cannot provide an
adequate justification within economic theory for failing to count emo98
tional response as a cost of an activity.

Counting the costs of emotional distress, however, will not save Pos-

ner's externalities theory of federal jurisdiction. It is not possible, except
in the most arbitrary fashion, to place a value on the feelings aroused
across the country by the deprivations of rights that take place in many
localities. 99 Uncertainty in valuation almost certainly will lead to a bias
toward the status quo because it is natural to choose the status quo over a
proposal for change with identifiable costs and nonquantifiable benefits.

Because moralisms are difficult to value, cost-benefit analysis is an inap-

propriate tool for problems involving moral controversy.10 0
More fundamentally, political and moral considerations, not concern for externalities, led to passage of the Reconstruction Era legislation
and more recent civil rights laws. Posner discusses state court bias
against federal interests as if it were an ancient relic. He forgets that only
a few years ago Congress found it desirable to subject states to suit in
97 The worldwide interest in the rights of black Africans living under the white minority government in South Africa is a current example of the effect moral considerations might have on people's
motivations. People and governments have been willing to forgo economic opportunities because of
their moral disapproval of the treatment of the black majority by the government. Moral outrage
also has been cited as a motivating factor behind national regulation of environmental quality. See
Stewart, supra note 94, at 1217-19.
98 Tort recovery for emotional distress is quite common. See, eg., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (requiring physical injury for recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (allowing
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Although it is difficult to value emotional
reactions, the national government could easily take such considerations into account in formulating
national policy. See J.S. MILL, supra note 94, at 222-23. I do not mean to argue, however, that
counting emotional costs is the answer to all my objections to Posner's theory. See infra notes 99100 and accompanying text.
99 The economist's method for valuing moralism would be to ask, in the absence of transactions
costs, how much people would be willing to pay to have their moral beliefs enacted into law. In
practice, one cannot answer this question.- Similar problems confront the economist's attempt to
analyze the efficiency of pollution regulation. See Kennedy, supra note 96, at 398-400.
100 The "offer-asking" problem exacerbates the status quo bias of cost-benefit analysis. This
problem is illustrated in Kelman, supra note 71, at 294 n.7. The holder of an entitlement will demand more to surrender it than he would be willing to pay to purchase it. For example, if the law
gives me the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the price I would demand to
give up that right will be higher than the amount of money I would pay to purchase the entitlement
in the first place. This problem subjects all economic analysis of legal rights to the criticism that the
analysis is skewed toward the status quo, because the valuations are made by comparing the asking
price people would demand to surrender legal rights with the price other people would offer to
purchase the legal rights. The "costs" of altering legal rights would be lower if economists focused
on the offer price of the potential purchaser of the entitlement, and not the asking price of the
current holder. The economist's response to the offer-asking problem is that it is a practical, not
theoretical, problem "with which economics will eventually cope." Kornhauser, The Great Image of
Authority, 36 STAN. L. REv. 349, 360 (1984).
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federal court for violating federal employment discrimination law.101
Deciding what norms the federal government should impose on state
governments involves important moral and social questions. The commitment to government that follows the law is basic to the ideology underlying the constitutional scheme. Relaxed federal scrutiny of state
officials' obedience to the Constitution could seriously undermine that
commitment and put in question the legitimacy of a system based upon
the limited consent of the governed. 10 2 Posner's "scientific method" for
determining the proper scope of federal power fails because legitimacy
depends upon adherence to the limits of consent and not upon a utilitarian calculus of optimal governmental activity.
Altering the system of federal scrutiny over state adherence to the
Constitution also might cause significant symbolic effects. That the federal courts stand ready to protect people's rights may provide an important symbol of hope to the victims of government abuse. The symbolic
value of decisions condemning officially sanctioned deprivations of rights
may help mobilize people in the same way that the Declaration of Independence's equality principle helped unite the abolitionists against slavery. As the federal courts move away from protecting rights by
contracting the scope of constitutional rights and expanding state and
official immunities from suit, the symbols are reversed and state officials
may see their transgressions as legitimate uses of government power.
Shutting the doors of federal courts to claims of civil rights violations
may give state violations the ultimate imprimatur of federal approval re10 3
quired for widespread abuses of power.
Further, the effect of relying upon state courts to safeguard federal
101 See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1980)); 42 U.S.C. (amending title VII's definition of "person" to
include states); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
102 I do not mean to argue that the Constitution itself would prohibit Congress from removing
federal jurisdiction over matters involving federal rights. Many scholars have debated the question
of Congress' control over federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sager, Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV.
17 (1981). See generally Gunther, CongressionalPower to CurtailFederal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the OngoingDebate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984). My point here is that as a
normative matter, it is inconsistent with a theory of limited government to allow the government to
decide whether to adhere to the Constitution based upon a purely utilitarian calculus.
103 These signals may be dangerous in another way because victories against government may be
more symbolic than real. Peter Gabel denies that Supreme Court decisions concerning the power of
governmental agencies and private entities have significant social effects. Rather, they serve to legitimize, through provision of a legalizing ideology, the power structure that already exists. See Gabel,
supra note 64, at 265. Gabel's analysis raises a new level of potential ambivalence regarding the
federal courts' role in our society. In individual cases, people on the left want the poor, powerless
person to win against his powerful oppressors. Yet they also should realize that Supreme Court
victories are not going to transform our oppressive, hierarchical society into a world in which people
have the freedom to form the sense of community that might lead to satisfaction of "people's real
human needs." Id. at 270. The possibility of radical change in people's living conditions is hampered by reliance on legal doctrine.
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fights remains uncertain. Posner thinks that the federal government
should trust state courts to vindicate federal fights, but he relies mainly
upon intuition to conclude that most federal cases probably would be decided the same way in state court. 104 Posner's willingness to advocate
these changes, despite such uncertainty, shows that he undervalues adherence to constitutional norms.
Characterizing these federal jurisdiction problems as ones of forumallocation and economic analysis of externalities sanitizes them beyond
recognition. Posner acknowledges that "few fields of modern American
law" enjoy "professional consensus on fundamental questions."' 0 5 The
increased number of actions brought to vindicate federal fights is a social
problem with social causes. Any attempted solution is bound to have
substantial social effects. Posner has done no more than attempt to circumvent the debate by hiding his moral agenda behind indeterminate
economic calculations and by failing to discuss the social problems implicated by his proposals. People will continue to disagree over questions of
federalism and constitutional values, but this disagreement is only exacerbated by allegedly new academic programs that avoid the issues.106
IV.
Judge Posner assumed a large responsibility when he decided to offer proposals for a fundamental reorientation of the role of the federal
courts in our government. His effort reveals a lack of vision with regard
to the role of the federal courts. Empirical evidence has not explained,
and possibly cannot explain, why so many people are turning to the federal courts to resolve their disputes. The potential effects of eliminating
federal control over enforcement of constitutional norms remains even
less certain. By challenging the notion that the federal courts are necessary to protect federal constitutional rights, Posner has challenged the
foundations of contemporary liberal legal consciousness. Unfortunately,
Posner has not explicitly confronted the moral, social, and political implications of his vision of the proper role of the federal courts. The invocation of federalist slogans and economic assumptions only places this
104 Posner asserts that "Title VII cases probably would not be decided much differently today in
state courts than in federal courts." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 188 (emphasis supplied). He also
argues that because most violations of federal civil rights are also violations of state law, state judges
will be similarly unsympathetic to the defendant. Id. at 189. But Posner also recognizes that while
"[i]n
some states today it would be quite wrong to impute to the state courts any prejudice against
persons asserting federal rights[,] in others one is not so sure." Id.
Posner relies upon intuition throughout the book, often for key points such as this one. I find it
difficult to make even an educated guess about how state courts would perform if federal matters
were turned over to them. In light of Posner's willingness to act without knowing the consequences,
his primary concern appears to be the federal docket, not enforcement of federal rights.
105 Id. at 153.
106 Cf. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 38-39
(1984).
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critical shortcoming into sharper relief. A realistic discussion of these
aspects is still needed, both to understand the current debate and to transcend its limits.
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